


INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY: AN ACADEMIA VIEWPOINT

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Cyber-Physical
Systems
Laboratory

- Assistant Professor of Computer Science at the UNO
- Director, Cyber-Physical Systems (**CyPhy**) Lab at UNO
- Working on the cybersecurity of ICS since 2010
 - “Forensic Readiness in Control Systems: Tools and Methods”
 - Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia
 - Had a power generation company as an industrial partner
- Related research interests include
 - Digital Forensics
 - Security via Virtualization
 - Malware Detection and Analysis
 - Cybersecurity Education
- Received more than 2.5 million dollars in research funding



TOP FOUR CHALLENGES FOR ACADEMIA

- Access of an ICS testbed
 - Expensive to build
 - Lack of publicly available testbeds
- Establishing collaborations with Industry
 - Tight-lipped SCADA/ICS owners and operators
- Teaching ICS security to cybersecurity students
 - Interdisciplinary nature of ICS
 - Lack of a textbook and publicly available supporting material
- Small ICS security research community in academia
 - Expand research focus; currently on IDS, Firewall ...
 - Encourage security researchers to take interest in ICS




ICS TESTBEDS

- ICS testbed in industry
 - Often used to test vendor patches
- Simulators
 - simSCADA to generate the network traffic of field sites
- Virtualization
 - Virtual machines; each can act as a controller/field device
- Small-scale real-world ICS
 - Use commercial software and hardware
 - Laboratory scale
 - Functional physical processes



ICS TESTBED AT UNO




ICS TESTBED AT UNO - FUNDING

- DoD's Defense University Research Instrumentation Program (DURIP)
- \$96,000 from Army Research Office (ARO)
- \$50,000 from UNO Foundation



GAS PIPELINE – TOP VIEW



GAS PIPELINE

—
**CABINET
VIEW**




POWER DISTRIBUTION — TOP VIEW





WASTEWATER FILTERING — TOP VIEW



WASTEWATER FILTERING — CABINET VIEW



COLLABORATION WITH INDUSTRY

- Industry can provide
 - close access to a real-world ICS/SCADA system,
 - technical assistance, and
 - financial support
- Industry collaboration is challenging
 - critical nature of ICS and physical processes
 - information leakage may cause damage
- Government can play a mediator role
- Community-of-interest meetings
 - gather ICS/SCADA owners and operators, vendors, and academia



TEACHING ICS SECURITY TO CS STUDENTS

- Challenges

- ICS is *interdisciplinary* in nature
- Raising interest of CS students
- Lack of a textbook on ICS security
- Lack of prerequisites for an ICS course

- ICS Security Course at UNO

- Content covers from Basic introductory level to Advance
- Hands-on approach, taught in a lab



COURSE ON ICS SECURITY FOR CS AT UNO

- Course Topics
 - Introduction to industrial control systems
 - PLC programming
 - ICS network protocols
 - ICS vulnerabilities and cyber attacks
 - ICS security solutions
- Hands-on Exercises
 - *PLC*: Allen-Bradley's Micrologix 1400 B
 - Program PLC to control Traffic Lights
 - Implement man-in-the middle attack



ICS SECURITY RESEARCH COMMUNITY

- Small ICS security research community in academia
- Encourage cybersecurity researchers to take interest in ICS security
- Current research efforts are mostly limited to
 - IDS
 - Firewall, etc.
- Expand ICS research focus to other areas such as
 - Digital forensics
 - Virtualization
 - Human factors such as security practices of control operators/engineers and mitigation of human errors
 - ICS Security Education



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